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SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
By letter dated April 6, 2011, the Court requested that the parties "address the
issue of whether the Modification of Business Loan Agreement and Promissory Note is
an enforceable agreement."
I.

The Modification Agreement is Valid and Enforceable.
Under Utah law, the existence of a valid, enforceable contract is a question of law.

John Deere Co. v. A & H Equip., Inc.. 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah 1994). The "formation
of a contract 'requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and .. . consideration.'" Aquagen Intern. Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411,
413 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). Thus, "[a] condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled
out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." Valcarce
v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). "Contractual mutual assent requires assent by
all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the
terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978).
Moreover, "[f]or a promise to be legally enforceable, it must be supported by
consideration." Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). "Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and
given in exchange for a promise." Id Any act or promise, bargained for and given in
exchange for a promise, constitutes consideration. See icf
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In this case? the Modification of Business Loan Agreement and Promissory Note
(R. 972-76), dated October 2, 2006 (the "Modification Agreement"), is valid and
enforceable. It clearly "spell[s] out'* the "express" terms of the parties' agreement, and
thereby evidences "a meeting of minds of the parties . . . with sufficient defmiteness to be
enforced." See Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428. It is also supported by consideration—
including, for example, the Borrowers' payment of an extension fee and release and
waiver of claims, in exchange for KeyBank's agreement to extend the loan term, which
KeyBank actually did. (R. 972-73, 977-80.)
II.

The Modification Agreement Was Signed by the Parties to be Charged,
Making It Enforceable Against the Borrowers Even If KeyBank Did Not
Sign.
Further, the Modification Agreement was signed by the Borrowers, as required by

statute to be enforceable. "The general rule in Utah is that a credit agreement is void
unless it is in writing and signed by the party to be charged with the agreement." Wright
Express Fin. Servs. Corp. v. ACAS Acquisition (Logex), Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84266 (D. Utah Nov. 14, 2007) (unpublished/attached); see a]so Utah Code Ann. § 25-54(l)(f) ("(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the
agreement: . . . (f) every credit agreement."). This is based on the well-settled and
universally recognized principle that an agreement "need only be signed by that party
who is sought to be charged." Weightman v. Caldwell 17 U.S. 85, 89 (1819) (citations
omitted).
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The Utah Code defines "credit agreement" to mean "an agreement by a financial
institution to: (1) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods,
or things in action; (11) otherwise extend credit; or (III) make any other financial

1
accommodation." Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2)(a)(i)(A). Here, the Modification
Agreement was made by KeyBank to "lend," "modify," "extend credit," and make other
"financial accommodation^]" for the benefit of the Borrowers, based on the original
Promissory Note, dated January 10, 2001. (R. 934-35.) Accordingly, the Modification
Agreement constitutes a "credit agreement" for which a signature "by the party to be
charged with the agreement" is required for enforceability.
Although KeyBank did not sign the Modification Agreement, the Borrowers—the
parties who were "sought to be charged" with the Modification Agreement—did.
Moreover, all subsequent modifications and change in terms agreements executed by the
parties (see R. 977-80) demonstrate KeyBank's acceptance and ratification of the
Modification Agreement and the Borrowers' understanding that the Modification
Agreement was valid and enforceable.
A party can indicate its intention to enter into a binding contract through its
actions rather than its signature. It is axiomatic that a party may become
bound through its performance to a contract that it has not signed . . . It is a
fundamental contract law that the parties may become bound by the terms
of a contract even though they did not sign the contract, where they have
otherwise indicated their acceptance of the contract, or led the other party to
so believe that they have accepted the contract. . . . It is established that a
signature is not always necessary to create a binding agreement.... It is
likewise established that the purpose of a signature is to demonstrate
"mutuality of assent" which could as well be shown through the conduct of
the parties.. .. That [a party] failed to sign the agreement is immaterial for
any written contract though signed only by one of the parties binds the
other if he accepts it and both act in reliance on it as a valid contract. . . . If
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a person has accepted a written agreement and has acted upon it he is bound
by it
Becker v. HSA/Wexford Bancgroup, L.L.C., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248-1249 (D. Utah
2001) (citations omitted).
As a matter of undisputed fact and law, the parties entered into subsequent
agreements on the strength of the prior Modification Agreement. (R. 977-80.)
Otherwise, the loans would previously have come due, and the Borrowers would already
have been in default for failure to pay when due. Either way, summary judgment based
on the Borrowers' defaults was appropriately granted.
III.

The Borrowers Cannot Dispute That They Were in Material Breach,
Relieving KeyBank of Any Obligation to Continue Lending.
There can be no dispute that the Borrowers committed numerous material

breaches and defaults under the loan documents, including the Modification Agreement.
u

The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to a contract excuses further

performance by the non-breaching party." Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883
P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, the Borrowers indisputably breached the Modification Agreement and
other loan documents by failing to provide accounts receivable information to maintain
their borrowing base, failing to provide financial statements, failing to maintain the
minimum assets-to-liabilities ratio, failing to provide tax returns, becoming insolvent,
failing to provide Halverson's personal financial information, and failing to disclose a
change in ownership and material adverse change in financial condition, among other
things. See Appellee's Br., pp. 10-12 (citing the record). The District Court correctly
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concluded that these various breaches and defaults were material, that the Borrowers did
not dispute them, and that KeyBank was entitled to summary judgment as a result.
Because of these breaches, the Borrowers are and were in no position to allege that
KeyBank had an obligation to continue lending to them, under the Modification
Agreement or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, together with those reasons set forth in KeyBank's
original and first supplemental briefs, this Court should affirm the District Court's
judgment.

^^

i* DATED this £ X day of April, 2011.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &
MCCARTHY

Stephen K. Christiansen
Gerald H. Suniville
Seth M. Mott
Attorneys for Appellee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that ] caused rwo (2) true and correct copies of the within and
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRJEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed, postage prepaid,
this f f day of April, 2011, to the following counsel of record:

ISOM LAW FIRM, PLLC
David K. Isom
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)209-7400
Facsimile: (801)590-8753

PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS
Matthew M. Boley
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801)363-4300
Facsimile: (801)363-4378

4848-1385-6265, v 3

4848-1385-6265, v. 3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ATTACHMENT

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Switch Client | Preferences | Help | Sign Out

Search

Get a D o c u m e n t

Shepards®

FOCUS™ Terms
Advanced...
Service: Get by LEXSEE®
Citation: 2 0 0 7 U.S. D i s t . LEXIS 8 4 2 6 6

More

History

Search Within Original Results (1 - 1)

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84266,

_ |

Alerts

View
Tutorial

*

± View Available Briefs and Other Documents Related to this Case
WRIGHT EXPRESS FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Plaintiff, vs. ACAS A C Q U I S I T I O N
(LOGEX), I N C . , ET A L , Defendants.
Case No. 2:06CV1039DAK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL D I V I S I O N
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8 4 2 6 6

November 14, 2 0 0 7 , Decided
November 14, 2 0 0 7 , Filed
P R I O R H I S T O R Y : Wright Express Fin. Servs. Corp. v . ACAS Acquisition ( L o g e x ) , I n c . , 2 0 0 7
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81359 ( D . Utah, Nov. 1 , 2 0 0 7 )
CASE S U M M A R Y
PROCEDURAL P O S T U R E : Plaintiff was a c o m p a n y t h a t established t w o lines of c o m m e r c i a l
credit for defendant parent c o r p o r a t i o n . The court g r a n t e d p l a i n t i f f s m o t i o n for s u m m a r y
j u d g m e n t and entered j u d g m e n t against t h e parent in t h e a m o u n t of $ 3 , 4 4 2 , 8 0 2 for failing
t o pay its obligations under the a g r e e m e n t s . Plaintiff presently brought t h e m o t i o n for
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t for t h e same a m o u n t against t h e o t h e r t w o d e f e n d a n t s , t h e parent's
w h o l l y - o w n e d subsidiaries.
O V E R V I E W : Plaintiff b r o u g h t t h e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n against t h e subsidiaries
because it claimed t h a t t h e parent was j u s t a shell holding c o m p a n y . The parent was t h e only
signatory to the t w o w r i t t e n line of c o m m e r c i a l credit a g r e e m e n t s w i t h plaintiff. One of t h e
a g r e e m e n t s was pursuant to a Master Card a g r e e m e n t . The subsidiaries a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e y
had failed and refused to pay the a m o u n t s owed to plaintiff under t h e a g r e e m e n t s , but
asserted t h a t t h e y w e r e not responsible for t h e parent's a g r e e m e n t s . The parent suffered
severe financial problems and had been unable to pay its d e b t s . Plaintiff claimed t h a t under
Utah Code A n n . § 2 5 - 5 - 4 ( 2 ) ( e ) , which was part of t h e Utah S t a t u t e of Frauds, t h e
subsidiaries were liable t o it under t h e cardholder a g r e e m e n t s t h a t t h e y received w h e n it
shipped the credit cards t o employees of t h e subsidiaries and t h e y used t h e m for t h e
business purposes of t h e subsidiaries. The court did not believe t h a t plaintiff's recourse was
i n the S t a t u t e of Frauds. Rather, plaintiff appeared t o have adequate recourse under its
unjust e n r i c h m e n t claim and under contract law. The court allowed d e f e n d a n t s 2 0 days t o
s u b m i t a surreply on t h e u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t c l a i m .
O U T C O M E : Plaintiff's m o t i o n for s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t w i t h respect t o t h e S t a t u t e of Frauds
was denied. The m o t i o n on p l a i n t i f f s u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t claim was o r d e r e d briefed according
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to the schedule set forth by the court.

CORE TERMS: card, unjust enrichment, summary judgment, credit agreement, cardholder,
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commercial credit, credit lines, amount owed, written agreements, oral argument,
consolidated, centralized, signatory, shipment, billings, reply
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HN3£The general rule in Utah is that a credit agreement is void unless it is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged with the agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1)
(f) (Supp. 2007). The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah is unwilling to
expand the exception to the Statute of Fraud's signature requirement, which applies
when there is no written credit agreement, to a situation where the card user was a
user contemplated by and/or covered by existing signed
agreements.
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M 4 £ U n d e r Utah law, to establish a claim of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must prove: (1)
a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) the conferee appreciates or has
knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the conferee retains the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without
payment of its value. More Like This Headnote
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OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Wright Express Financial Services Corporation's
Motion for Summary Judgment. The court held a hearing on the motion on October 11, 2007. At
the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by Mark Callister, and Defendants were represented by
Matthew Lalli and Amber Mettler. The court took the motion under advisement. The court has
carefully considered all pleadings, memoranda, and other materials submitted by the parties.
The court has further considered the arguments made by counsel at the hearing and the law
and facts relevant to the motions. Now being fully advised, the court enters the following
Memorandum [ * 2 ] Decision and Order.
BACKGROUND
On December 5, 2005, Plaintiff Wright Express Financial Services entered into a Business
Charge Account Agreement ("Fleet Charge Agreement") with Defendant ACAS Acquisition, Inc.
("ACAS"). Under this Agreement, Plaintiff established a line of commercial credit for ACAS in the
amount of $ 3 million. Also, on December 29, 2005, ACAS entered into a Corporate Card
Program Master Agreement with Plaintiff. Under this MasterCard Agreement, Plaintiff established
a line of commercial credit for ACAS in the amount of $ 350,000. This amount was increased to
$ 600,000 in March 2006, and then increased again to $ 1,600,000 in April 2006.
This court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment and entered judgment against ACAS in the
amount of $ 3,442,802.33 for failing to pay its obligations owing under the agreements. Plaintiff
claims, however, that ACAS is just a shell holding company. Therefore, Plaintiff brings this
motion for summary judgment for the same amount against the other two defendants, Logex
Corporation and Logistics Express, Inc. ("LEI"), both of which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of
ACAS. Defendant LEI is a company in the business of transporting gas and other [ * 3 ] related
products. LEI is a subsidiary of Defendant Logex, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of ACAS.
ACAS was the only signatory to the written agreements with Plaintiff. However, ACAS sent the
combined financial and asset information of ACAS, Logex, and LEI when it was applying for the
credit. In December 2006, Plaintiff requested that Logex and LEI sign the agreements as well.
LEI and Logex refused to execute the agreements.
Pursuant to the Fleet Charge Agreement and the MasterCard Agreement between Plaintiff and
ACAS, Plaintiff issued charge cards to employees, representatives, or agents of Logex and LEI
who were authorized by ACAS to use the charge cards in connection with business operations.
The charges on these cards were made under the credit lines established by Plaintiff as a result
of the agreements with ACAS. ACAS admits that the $ 3,442,802.33 owing to Plaintiff for
charges made by employees of Logex and LEI were incurred pursuant to the credit line provided
to ACAS. Defendants Logex and LEI were aware that their employees were charging businessrelated expenses on the cards issued by Plaintiff.
Included in each shipment of Fleet charge cards to employees of Logex and LEI was [ * 4 ] a
copy of the Wright Express Business Charge Account Agreement. The Cardholder Agreement
states, "Your use of your account indicates your acceptance of this Wright Express Business
Charge Account Agreement." The Fleet charge cards contained the statement: "Use of this card
constitutes acceptance of the terms and conditions of the cardholder agreement under which
this card was issued, as amended from time to time." The Fleet Cardholder Agreement between
Plaintiff and ACAS provides that the "business card holder" agrees to pay "the face amount of all
such credit obligations created by use of a Card."
Included in each shipment of MasterCards was a copy of the MasterCard Cardholder Agreement,
which states, "Any use of your Card or Account confirms your acceptance of the terms and
conditions of this Cardholder Agreement." On the back of each Mastercard issued to these
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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employees was a statement that reads, "Your card is issued and serviced by Wright Express
Financial Services Corporation pursuant to license by MasterCard International. Its use is
subject to the terms and conditions of your Card Member Agreement." The MasterCard
Cardholder Agreements provides that each entity receiving a card [ * 5 ] under the MasterCard
Agreement is responsible to pay the full amount owed on the Account.
The parties appear to dispute that the MasterCard Agreement included a provision whereby the
parties agreed to centralized billings. The parties also dispute whether centralized billings Is
relevant to the issues presented in this motion.
Defendants Logex and LEI admit that they have failed and refused to pay the amounts owed to
Plaintiff under the Fleet Charge Agreement and the MasterCard Agreement, Logex and LEI
assert that they are not responsible for ACAS's agreements. ACAS has suffered severe financial
problems and has been unable to pay its debts.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
Although Plaintiff has already obtained judgment against ACAS for the amount due and owing
under its agreements, Plaintiff argues that ACAS is merely a holding company with no real
ability to pay the debt. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks judgment against Defendants Logex and LEI for
the same amount it received judgment against ACAS.
Plaintiff claims that under Utah Code Annotated Section 25-5-4(2)(e), Logex and LEI are liable
to Plaintiff under the cardholder agreements that Defendants received when Plaintiff
[ * 6 ] shipped the credit cards to employees of Logex and LEI and used them for the business
purposes of Logex and LEI. Section 25-5-4(2)(e), which is part of the Utah Statute of Frauds,
provides as follows:
H/Vi:

?(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature by
the party to be charged if:
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the agreement:
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall constitute
acceptance of those terms; and
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person authorized by
the debtor, requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the
credit offered.

Id.
I n this case, Plaintiff sent copies of the Fleet Charge Agreement and MasterCard Cardholder
Agreement to certain officers of Logex and LEI along with cards that were used by those
officers. Defendants, however, contend that it is inappropriate to apply an exception to the
Statute of Frauds in this situation because there is a signed agreement between Plaintiff and
ACAS for the credit that was used.
H/v2

?Unsigned form credit agreements, identical in all respects to the agreements signed
between Plaintiff and ACAS, forwarded to [ * 7 ] known related parties covered by signed
agreements, cannot create separate obligations on the part of the subsidiaries. If such actions
could create new contractual obligations between the parties, it would violate the integration
clauses in the Credit Agreements. Both agreements state that they contain the entire agreement
between the parties and that no modification is valid unless set forth in a written agreement
signed by both parties.
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H/V3

TThe general rule in Utah is that a credit agreement is void unless it is in writing and signed
by the party to be charged with the agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 2 5 - 5 - 4 ( l ) ( f ) (Supp. 2007).
The court is unwilling to expand the exception to the Statute of Fraud's signature requirement,
which applies when there is no written credit agreement, to a situation where the card user was
a user contemplated by and/or covered by existing signed agreements. Although the court does
not condone a party's actions to avoid payment of their credit obligations, the court does not
believe that Plaintiffs recourse lies in the Statute of Frauds. Rather, Plaintiff appears to have
adequate recourse under its unjust enrichment claim and under contract law.
There are potential [ * 8 ] ambiguities in the agreements with respect to Logex's and LEI's
potential liability under the agreements. Defendants argue that under the terms of the
agreements they are not liable for the credit agreements entered into between Plaintiff and
ACAS, and this court should not expand liability to known third parties who were not made
signatories to the agreements. The signed agreements identify only ACAS as the company
responsible to pay Plaintiff. But ACAS's credit application to Plaintiff consisted of Consolidated
Financial Statements that included the accounts of ACAS, Logex, and LEI. In other words, ACAS
used the assets of Logex and LEI to obtain credit from Plaintiff. For purposes of this motion, the
court need not resolve factual issues relating to Logex and LEI's liability on the written credit
agreement executed by ACAS.
However, the summary judgment motion now before the court also seeks summary judgment
on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. H/V4 "?Under Utah law, to establish a claim of unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) the
conferee appreciates or has knowledge of the benefit; and (3) the conferee retains the benefit
under [ * 9 ] such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit
without payment of its value. Bluffdale City v. Smith, 156 P.3d 175, n.2, 2007 UT App 25 (Utah
Ct. App. 2007).
In this case, the CFO of Logex and ACAS submitted a credit application that represented ACAS
as a consolidated company comprised of the assets of Logex and LEI. Both defendants admit
that charge cards issued by Plaintiff were used by Logex or LEI employees for business
expenses. Having used their assets to obtain credit from Plaintiff that was in fact used in the
operation of their business, allowing Logex and LEI to retain this benefit without payment to
Plaintiff would be inequitable.
Based on the record presently before the court, the court is prepared to rule in Plaintiff's favor
on the unjust enrichment claim. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that Plaintiff did not move
for summary judgment on its unjust enrichment claim until its reply memorandum, and neither
party directly addressed the issue at oral argument. In addition, Defendants changed counsel
between the briefing of the motion and oral argument. Because Defendants have not addressed
the unjust enrichment claim, the court will allow Defendants [ * 1 0 ] twenty days to submit a
surreply on the unjust enrichment claim. Plaintiffs may then submit a final reply on the issue
within ten days. The court will then issue its ruling on the unjust enrichment claim without a
further hearing.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the
Statute of Frauds is DENIED. The motion on Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim shall be briefed
according to the schedule set forth above.
DATED this 14th day of November, 2007.
BY THE COURT
I si Dale A. Kimball
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